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This is the second of a series of articles on the hearsay 
rule. The first article discussed the definition of hearsay. 
This article examines a number of hearsay exceptions. 
Ohio Evidence Rule 803 specifies twenty-two hearsay 
exceptions. Rule 804 recognizes five additional excep-
tions. In contrast to the exceptions enumerated in Rule 
804, the Rule 803 exceptions do not depend on the 
unavailability of the declarant. 
Rule 803 changed prior Ohio law in a number of 
respects. These changes are discussed in connection 
with the specific exceptions to which they relate. The rule 
also differs from Federal Rule 803. These differences are 
also discussed in connection with specific exceptions. 
Two exceptions recognized in Federal Rule 803 were not 
adopted in Ohio. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(18) (learned trea-
tise exception); Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) (residual exception). 
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: UNDERLYING THEORY 
The hearsay exceptions recognized in Rules 803 and 
804 are based on some circumstantial guarantee of trust-
worthiness that is thought to warrant admissibility 
notwithstanding the lack of cross-examination, oath, and 
personal appearance of the declarant. In some cases, an 
exception is also supported by a necessity argument. 
Wigmore argued that all exceptions were based on these 
two considerations - "a circumstantial probability of 
trustworthiness and a necessity, for the evidence." 5 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1420, at 251 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
The necessity principle is clearly present in the excep-
tions specified in Rule 804, because the unavailability of 
the declarant is required as a condition of admissibility. 
The Rule 803 exceptions, however, also may be justified 
upon a modified necessity argument, that is, the hearsay 
statement is thought to be superior to the declarant's trial 
testimony. Wigmore explained this consideration as 
follows: "The assertion may be such that we cannot 
expect, again, or at this time, to get evidence ofthe same 
value from the same or other sources. This appears more 
or less fully in the exception for spontaneous declara-
tions, for reputation, and in part elsewhere. Here we are 
not threatened: .. with the entire loss of a person's 
evidence, but merely of some valuable source of 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
evidence. The necessity is not so great; perhaps hardly a 
necessity, only an expediency or convenience, can be 
predicated." /d. § 1421, at 253. 
Wigmore explained the guarantee of trustworthiness 
consideration as follows: "The second principle which, 
combined with the first [necessity], satisfies us to accept 
the evidence untested is in the nature of a practicable 
substitute for the ordinary test of cross-examination. We 
see that under certain circumstances the probability of 
accuracy and trustworthiness of statements is practically 
sufficient, ifnot quite equivalent to that of statements 
tested in the variety of circumstances sanctioned by judi-
cial practice; and it is usually from one of these salient 
circumstances that the exception takes its name." /d. § 
1422, at 253. 
FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION RULES 
Several hearsay exceptions specifically require first-
hand knowledge on the part of the declarant. E.g, Rules 
803(5) and (6). For other exceptions, firsthand knowledge 
is not explicitly required. Nevertheless, firsthand knowl-
edge is a requirement for all exceptions. This has been 
the traditional view. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1424 
(Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 803 reads: "In a hearsay situation, the 
declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule 
nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand 
knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be infer-
able from circumstances. See Rule 602." 
PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS 
Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for present 
sense impressions. The rule requires: (1) a statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition, (2) about 
which the declarant had firsthand knowledge, (3) made 
at the time the declarant was perceiving the event or 
immediately thereafter, (4) under circumstances that do 
not indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The present sense 
impression exception was not recognized. under prior 
Ohio law, although statements that fall within this excep-
tion may have been admitted as res gestae. 
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The reliability of present sense impressions rests upon 
the d~clarant's lack of time to fabricate. In the leading 
case, ljQ!J~!QO pxygen Co., Inc. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 
S.W.2d 474 (1942), the court held that the statement was 
"sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of 
being manufactured evidence. There was no time for a 
calculated statement." /d. at 6. The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Fed~ral Rule 803 states: "The underlying theory 
of Exception (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of 
event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate 
or consciousmil;;representation." In addition, the time 
require,ment :...._ "substantial contemporaneity" -
eliminates any problem associated with defects in the 
declarant's ability to remember the event. 
This theory of admissibility differs from the theory 
which' underlies the excited utterance exception recog-
nized in Rule 803(2). The reliability of excited utterances 
is based upon the declarant's Jack of capacity to fabri-
cate. This difference in theory explains the differences 
between the requirements for the two exceptions. For 
example;:ast<irtling or exciting event is required for the 
excited utterance but not the present sense impression 
exception: Other differences are discussed below. 
Frequently, however, a statement will satisfy the require-
ments of both exceptions. 
Time requirement 
Rule B03(1) requires the statement be made "while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or 
immeqiately thereafter." The statement must be nearly 
contemporaneous with the perception of the event. This 
requirement is more restrictive than the time requirement 
for-excited-utterances. An excited utterance could be 
mac:le--mirlUtes (sometimes hours) after the exciting 
event;_qQ lpng ;3.s the declarantis under:.theJnfluence of 
the excitenientcaused by the event at the time the state-
ment is made. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule l303 provides the following explanation: "With 
respect to the time element, Exception (1) recognizes that 
in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity 
is not pQ~sible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable. 
Under Exception (2) [excited utterances] the standard of 
measurememt is the duration of the state of excitement." 
Subject matter requirement 
The rule requires that the statement describe or 
explain an event or condition.Thisrequirement follows 
from the theory underlying the exception - lack of time 
to fabricate. Statements beyond descriptions or explana-
tions indicate that the declarant has had sufficient time to 
think abouithe event. In contrast, the subject matter of 
an excited utterance is not so circumscribed - state-
ments "relating to a starling event" are admissible. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803 
states: "Permissible subject matter of the statement is 
limited under Exception (1) to description or explanation 
of the event or condition, the assumption being that 
spontaneity, in the absence of a startling event, may 
extend no farther. In Exception (2) [excited utterances], 
however, the statement need only 'relate' to the startling 
event or condition, thus affording a broader scope of 
subject matter coverage." Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 
249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 
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(1958), cited in the Note, illustrates the difference 
between the two exceptions. In that case the statement of 
a driver who was involved in an accident was admitted as 
an excited utterance. The statement revealed that the 
driver was acting as an agent at the time of the 1ccident. 
This statement would not qualify as a present &ense 
impression because it does not explain or describe the 
event. The statement did qualify as an excited utterance 
because it "related" to the event. 
Circumstances of lack of trustworthiness 
__ l.nQ.QD!rast t() Federal Rule 803(1}, the Ohio rule 
expTiclffy permHs-the exclusion of a statement that would 
otherwise_. qualify as a present sense impression if the 
"circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." lden-
ticalphrases appear in the business records and public 
records exceptions. See Rule 803(6) and (8}. See also 
Fla. Stat. Ann. Evid. Code§ 90.803(1}. 
One of the g·uarantees of trustworthiness upon which 
the present sense impression exception is based is verifi-
cation. For example, the following statement appears in 
the second edition of McCormick: "the statement will 
usually have been made to a third party (the person who 
subsequently testifies to it) who, being present at the 
time and scene of the observation, will usually have an 
opportunity to observe the situation himself and thus 
provide a check on the accuracy of the declarant's state-
ment." McCormick, Evidence 710 (2d ed. 1972). But if the 
witness (the third party) heard the statement but did not 
perceive the event, this safeguard is not present. The 
"lack of trustworthiness" clause was intended to protect 
against this possibility. The Staff Note contains the 
following commentary: 
One of the principal elements of the circumstantial 
guaranty oftrustworthiness of this exception is that the 
statement was made at a time and under circum-
stances in which the person to whom the statement 
was made would be in a position to verify the state-
ment. The provision requiring exclusion if the circum-
stances do not warrant a high degree of 
trustworthiness would justify exclusion if, for example, 
the statement were made by a declarant concerning a 
perceived event to another by way of a C. B. radio 
transmission. Other circumstances other than the lack 
of verification may also taint the trustworthiness of this 
class of hearsay declaration. 
The latest edition of McCormick, however, argues that 
the verification requirement is not necessary. McCor-
mick, Evidence§ 198, at 862 (3d ed. 1984). 
EXCITED UTTERANCES 
Rule 803(2) recognizes a hearsay exception for excited 
utterances. The rule requires: (1} a startling event; (2} a 
statement relating to that event; (3) made by a declarant 
with firsthand knowledge; and (4) made while the declar-
ant was under the stress of the excitement caused by the 
event. 
The excited utterance exception had been recognized 
in the prior Ohio cases, although rarely by that name. 
The early cases treat such statements as res gestae. See 
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, 120 
Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 582 (1929); State v. Lasecki, 90 
Ohio St. 10, 106 N.E. 660 (1914). Later cases use the term 
"spontaneous exclamations." See State v. Price, 60 Ohio 
St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
943 (1980). 
The reliability of excited utterances rests upon the 
declarant's lack of capacity to fabricate. "The theory of 
Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce 
a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the 
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of 
conscious fabrication." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
R. Evid. 803. The Note also recognizes the principal criti-
cism of the exception- "That excitement impairs 
accuracy of observation as well as eliminating conscious 
fabrication." /d. The trial court determines the admissibil-
ity of excited utterances-under Rule 104(a)and is accord-
ed wide discretion in this determination. State v. Rohdes, 
23 Ohio St.3d 225, 229, 492 N.E.2d 430 (1986). 
Startling event requirement 
The rule requires that the statement relate to a "star-
tling event or condition." This requirement follows from 
the theory underlying the exception; without a startling 
event, the declarant's capacity to reflect and fabricate will 
not be suspended. In State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215, 
373 N.E.2d 1234 (1978), the Supreme Court stated the 
requirement as follows: "[T]here [must be] some occur-
rence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement 
in the declarant, which was sufficient to still his reflective 
faculties and thereby make his statements and declara-
tions the unreflective and sincere expression of his actu-
al impressions and beliefs ... " /d. (syllabus, para. 1); 
accord, Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 
(1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. 
Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 682 (1920). 
The declarant may be a participant in the event - for 
example, the victim of an assault or the driver of a vehicle 
involved in an automobile accident. The declarant may 
also be a bystander. See New York, Chicago & St. Louis 
R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, supra; State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 
106 N.E. 660 (1914); Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803 ("Participation by the declarant is not required."). 
If the bystander-declarant is unidentified, admissibility 
of the statement requires close scrutiny. The federal 
drafters recognized this problem. "[W)hen declarant is 
an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy in 
upholding the statement alone as sufficient, ... a result 
which would under appropriate circumstances be consis-
tent with the rule." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. See also New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. 
Co. v. Kovatch, supra (unidentified bystander's statement 
admitted). 
Proof of the startling event may consist of extrinsic 
evidence of the event, including the condition of the 
declarant. In addition, the utterance itself may establish 
the existence of a startling event. See McCormick, 
Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984). Consideration of the state-
ment itself for this purpose is permissible because under 
Rule 104(A) "the judge is not limited by the hearsay rule 
in passing upon preliminary questions of fact." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
Under the stress of excitement requirement 
The rule requires that the statement have been made 
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"while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition." This requirement 
follows from the theory underlying the exception; unless 
the declarant is speaking while under the influence of the 
event, his capacity to reflect and fabricate will not be 
suspended. 
The federal drafters refer to this requirement as the 
"time element." "Under Exception (2) the standard of 
measurement is the duration of the state of excitement. 
'How long can excitement prevail? Obviously there are 
no pat answers and the character of the transaction or 
event will largely determine the significance of the time 
factor.' Slough, Spontaneous Statement and State of 
Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224, 243 (1961) ... "Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. In State v. Boston, 
46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), the Supreme 
Court commented: "[TJhe lapse of time between the star-
tling event and the out-of-court statement is not disposi-
tive in the application of Evid. R. 803(2). Rather, the 
question is whether the declarant is still under the stress 
of nervous excitement from the event." /d. at 118. 
In State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215,373 N.E.2d 1234 
(1978), the Supreme Court stated the requirement as 
follows: "[T]he statement or declaration, even if not strict-
ly contemporaneous with the exciting cause, [must be] 
made before there has been time for such nervous 
excitement to lose a domination over [the declarant's) · 
reflective faculties, so that such domination continued to 
remain sufficient to make his statements and declara-
tions the unreflective and sincere expression of his actu-
al impressions and beliefs .. . "/d. (syllabus, para 1); 
accord, Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 
(1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. 
Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 166 N.E. 682 (1929); State v. 
Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 106 N.E. 660 (1914). 
Hence, statements made after a substantial time has 
elapsed may be admissible so long as the declarant 
remained under the influence of the exciting event when 
the statement was made. See State v. Duncan, supra; 
McCormick, Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984). In State v. 
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988), the 
statement was made 15 hours after the event, during 
which time the declarant was unconscious. The Court 
held the statement admissible. 
A statement made in response to a question may also 
fit within this exception. See State v. Duncan, supra; 
State v. Dickerson, 51 Ohio App.2d 255,367 N.E.2d 927 
(1977); Bergfeld v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. 
Co., 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E.2d 483 (1956). In State v. 
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988), the 
Court ruled 
that the admission of a declaration as an excited utter-
ance is not precluded by questioning which: (1) is 
neither coercive nor leading, (2) facilitates the declar-
ant's expression of what is already the natural focus of 
the declarant's thoughts, and (3) does not destroy the 
domination of the nervous excitement over the declar-
ant's reflective faculties. /d. at 93. 
Subject matter requirement 
The rule requires that the statement "relate" to a star-
tling event. See State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215, 373 
N.E.2d 1234 (1978); Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 
N.E.2d 140 (1955). This requirement is simply a refine-
ment of the "under the stress of the excitement" require- · 
ment discussed previously. Statements that do not 
"relate" to the starting event indicate that the declarant is 
no longer speaking while under the influence of the 
event. In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508 
(D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), the 
court explained: "[A]s soon as the excited utterance goes 
beyond description of the exciting event and deals with 
past facts or with the future it may tend to take on a 
reflective quality ... In other words, the very fact that the 
utterance is not descriptive of the exciting event is one of 
the factors which the trial court must take into account in 
the evaluation of whether the statement is truly a spon-
taneous, impulsive expression excited by the event." /d. 
at 511. 
Firsthand Knowledge 
The firsthand knowledge rule applies to excited utter-
ances. See State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215, 373 
N.E.2d 1234 (1978); Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 
N.E.2d 140 (1955); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. 
Co. v. Kovatch, 120 Ohio St. 532, 540, 166 N.E. 682, 684 
(1929) (opportunity to observe inferred from circum-
stances); State v. Moorman, 7 Ohio App.3d 251, 455 
N.E.2d 495 (Hamilton 1982) (personal knowledge may be 
"inferred"}; McCormick, Evidence§ 297, at 858 (3d ed. 
1984) ("Direct proof is not necessary; if the circum-
stances appear consistent with opportunity [to observe] 
by the declarant, this is sufficient."). 
Competency 
Rules relating to the competency of witnesses (Rule 
601), have not been applied to excited utterances. See 
McCormick, Evidence§ 297 (3d ed. 1984}. Most of the 
Ohio cases have involved the statements of a young 
child. E.g., State v. Duncan, supra (six year old child); 
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, supra 
(five year old child); State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10, 106 
N.E. 660 (1914) (four year old child). In State v. Wallace, 
37 Ohio St.3d 87, 524 N.E. 466 (1988), the Court ruled 
"that the inability to establish the competency of a child 
declarant does not affect the admissibility of the declara-
tions for purposes of Evid. R. 803(2)." /d. at 88. 
Opinion Rule 
In Neisner Brothers, Inc. v. Schafer, 124 Ohio St. 311, 
178 N.E. 269 (1931), the Supreme Court excluded an 
excited utterance because the utterance violated the 
opinion rule. McCormick criticized this case. "Where the 
declarant is an in-court witness, it is probably appropriate 
to require him to testify in concrete terms rather than 
conclusory generalizations. But in every day life people 
often talk in conclusory terms and when these state-
ments are later offered in court there is no opportunity to 
require the declarant to substitute more specific 
language. Here, as elsewhere, the opinion rule should be 
applied sparingly, if at all, to out-of-court speech." 
McCormick, Evidence 859 and n. 40 (3d ed. 1984). 
Moreover, in a later case the Court ruled that an excit-
ed utterance was not inadmissible because it was in the 
form of a conclusion- that the declarant had just seen 
her boss "murdered" for "no reason." State v. Rohdes, 
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23 Ohio St.3d 225, 228, 492 N.E.2d 430 (1986). 
STATEMENTS OF PHYSICAl CONDITION OR MIND 
Rule 803(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for state-
ments of a declarant's "then existing state of mind, 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health) ... " The rule explicitly excludes statements "of 
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms, of declarant's will." Many of the 
prior Ohio casescfteated sfa,tements falling within this 
exception as partpf the vague res gestae rule. 
For purposes of analysis, the subject matter of Rule 
803(3) is divided into fourcategories: (1) statements of 
presently existing physical condition, (2) statements of 
presently existing state of mind offered to prove that state 
of mind, (3) statements of presently existing state of mind 
offered to prove t~edeclarant acted in accordance with 
that state of mind,cand (4) statements of memory or belief 
offered to prove the fact remembered or believed. 
Presently existing physical condition 
Statements of presently existing physical condition or 
sensation, including statements of "pain" and "bodily 
health," are admissible under Rule 803(3). The critical 
requirement is thatthe statement relate to a present 
condition and not fa· past conditions, pains, or symptoms. 
The statement must be contemporaneous with the condi-
tion, not the everit which caused the condition. State-
ments of past physical conditions are governed by Rule 
803(4), which requires thatsuch statements be made for 
the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. This 
requirementis"noHoundincRule803(3); a statement of 
present physical condition may be made to any person 
for any reason. Rules 803(3) and 803(4) overlap some-
what because the latter rule also covers statements of 
present physical conditions made for the purpose of 
medical treatment or diagnosis. 
The reliability of statements of presently existing physi-
cal condition rests on the spontaneity of the statement, 
which reduces the risk of conscious fabrication. See 
McCormick, Eyideo_ce § 291, at 838 (3d ed. 1986). In 
addition, this exception is justified on a necessity argu-
ment. "Being spontaneous, they are considered of great-
er probative value than the present testimony of the 
declarant." /d. See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1714 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
The few prior Ohio cases on this issue are not consis-
tent. In Stough v. Industrial Comm., 148 Ohio St. 415, 75 
N.E.2d 441 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld the admis-
sibility of a statement, "He said he had a headache," on 
the theory that the statement was part of the res gestae. 
In Smith v. Young, 109 Ohio App. 463, 168 N.E.2d 3 
(1958), the court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's 
wife "to the effect that she had heard plaintiff complain of 
pain in his chest." !d. at 470. The court held the statement 
inadmissible hearsay and self-serving. The result in this 
case would be different under Rule 803(3), which does 
not exclude statements merely because they are self-
serving. See McCormick, Evidence§ 290 (3d ed. 1984). 
I~ 
Statements of presently existing state of mind 
Statements of presently existing state of mind or 
emotion, including statements of "intent, plan, motive, 
design, [or) mental feeling," are admissible under Rule 
803(3). A person's state of mind is often a consequential 
or material fact under the substantive law. 
This exception rests on the same reliability rationale as 
statements of presently existing physical condition, i.e., 
the spontaneity of the statement reduces the risk of 
conscious fabrication. See McCormick, Evidence§ 294 
(3d ed. 1984). In addition, the exception is supported by a 
necessity argument; in most cases, the statement is 
more probative of state of mind than later trial testimony. 
Frequently, statements regarding the mental state of 
the declarant are not hearsay because they are not 
offered to prove the truth of the assertion contained in the 
statement. For example, a declarant's statement, "I will 
kill John Doe," offered to prove intent in a homicide 
prosecution, is hearsay but falls with the exception of 
Rule 803(3). The statement, ':John Doe is the most 
despicable person I know," offered to prove intent, is not 
offered to prove the truth of the assertion and is, there-
fore, not hearsay. 
See State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 514 
N.E.2d 394 (1987) (declarant's statement that she was 
"fearful" and "apprehensive" admitted); State v. Sage, 
31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987) (declar-
ant's statement that she intended to "break up" with 
defendant admitted). 
State of mind offered to prove future conduct 
Statements of presently existing state of mind are 
admissible under Rule 803(3) to prove that the declarant 
subsequently acted in accordance with that state of 
mind. For example, a declarant's statement, "I will kill 
John Doe," is admissible to prove that the declarant 
killed Doe as well as to prove his intent to kill. Such state-
ments are less reliable proof of further conduct than of 
present intent because people frequently do not or 
cannot carry out their intentions. As McCormick notes, 
the problem "becomes one of relevancy." McCormick, 
Evidence § 295, at 846 (3d ed. 1984). 
The leading case on this point is Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), where letters in which 
the declarant stated that he intended to travel from Wichi-
ta to Crooked Creek with another person (Hillman) were 
offered in evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court held the 
letters admissible: 
The letters ... were competent not as narratives of 
facts communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as 
proof that he actually went away from Wichita, but as 
evidence that, shortly before the time when other 
evidence tended to show that he went away, he had 
the intention of going, and of going with Hillman, 
which made it more probable both that he did go and 
that he went with Hillman, than if there had been no 
proof of such intention. /d. at 295-96. 
Prior Ohio cases recognizing this exception have been 
decided as res gestae cases. See Outland v. Industrial 
' Comm., 136 Ohio St. 488, 26 N.E.2d 760 (1940); Railway 
Co. v. Herrick, 49 Ohio St. 25, 29 N.E. 1052 (1892); Finne-
gan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 81 Abs. 417, 162 
N.E.2d 216 (App. 1958). 
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This rule poses the problem of whether statements 
admissible under the rule may be offered to prove that a 
person other than the declarant also engaged in the 
intended conduct- for example, that Hillman accompa-
nied the declarant to Crooked Creek. The House Judici-
ary Committee Report attempted to limit the rule in this 
respect: "[T]he Committee intends that the Rule be 
construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Hillman ... so as to render statements of intent by 
a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, 
not the future conduct of another person." H.R. Rep. No. 
650, 93rd Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S. 
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7087. Some federal cases, 
however, have admitted such statements. United States 
v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub 
nom, lnciso v. United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). But 
see United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
Statements of remembrance 
Statements of "memory or belief [offered] to prove the 
fact remembered or believed" are inadmissible unless 
the statement relates to the execution, revocation, iden-
tification, or terms of declarant's will." The federal 
drafters explained this limitation: 'The exclusion of 'state-
ments of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 
or believed' is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction 
of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from 
allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, 
to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of 
the event which produced the state of mind." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. See also Shepard v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); McCormick, Evidence 
§ 296 (3d ed. 1984). 
STATEMENTS OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT 
Rule 803(4) recognizes a hearsay exception for state-
ments "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment and describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or gener-
al character of the cause or external source thereof inso-
far as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." 
Such statements are often part of a hospital or medical 
record and thus may present double hearsay problems. 
See Rule 805 (multiple hearsay). 
Stateme11ts made for treatment 
The reliability of statements made for the purpose of 
medical treatment, including past symptoms and pain, 
rests on the theory that the declarant would not fabricate 
under these circumstances because the effectiveness of 
the treatment depends on the accuracy of the statement. 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 292 (3d ed. 1988). In Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Files, 65 Ohio St. 403, 62 N.E. 1047 (1901), 
the Supreme Court stated: "It is to be presumed in such 
case, that he states the truth, as it is to his interest that he 
should do so, and not mislead the physician by false 
statements as to his condition. He is under a strong 
motive in such case to state the truth, and it is on this 
ground that such evidence is admitted." /d. at 406; 
accord, Baker v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ohio App. 539, 
186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cunningham v. Ward Baki11g Co., 28 
Abs. 111 (App. 1938); Hartley v. Model Dairy Products 
Co,, 25Abs.146 (App. 1937). · 
Statements made for diagnosis 
Rule 803(4) is not limited to statements made for the 
purpose of medical treatment. It also covers statements 
made for the purpose of diagnosis, i.e., statements made 
to a physician solely for the purpose of presenting expert 
testimony at trial. Such statements were not admissible 
under prior Ohio law. See Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 65 
Ohio St. 403, 62 N.E. 1047 (1901); Lidyard v. General 
Fireproofing Co., 62 Ohio App. 500, 24 N.E.2d 635 
(1939). . .. . . .. . · .. 
This part of the rule does not rest on any special guar-
anteeof trustworthiness, but rathE)r (Jn a pragmatic 
assessment of the use of expert testimony at trial. A 
physician, consulted only for the purpose of testifying as 
an expert, may state an opinion; the opinion is often 
based, in part, on medical history provided by the 
patient. Although the medical history was not admissible 
as substantive evidence under prior law, it was admissi-
ble to show the basis of the expert's opinion. See DiMar-
zo v. Columbus Transit Co., 100 Ohio App. 521, 137 
N.E.2d 766 (1955) (patient informed physician she "had 
been injured in a bus accident."); ct. Scott v. Campbell, 
115 Ohio App. 208, 184 N.E.2d 485 {1961) (patient 
informed physician she had suffered a "blow to her 
knee."). The federal drafters concluded that the distinc-
tion was too difficult for a jury to appreciate: 
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hear-
say exception, as not within its guarantee of truth-
fulness, statements to a physician consulted only 
for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While 
thes.e statements were. not admissible as substan-
tive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the 
basis of his opinion, including statements of this 
kind. The distinction thils.cailed.forwas 'one most 
unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly 
rejects the limitation. Advisory Committee's Note, 
Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
Other requirements 
Although the rule requires the statement be made for 
medical diagnosis or treatment, the statement need not 
be made to a physician. "Statements to hospital atten-
dants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family 
might be included." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. 
The rule is limited to statements that describe "medi-
cal history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa-
tions, or the inception or general character of the cause 
or external source thereof insofar as reasonably perti-
nent to diagnosis or treatment." The provision relating to 
"causes" represents a change in Ohio law. For example, 
in Dugan v. Industrial Comm., 135 Ohio St. 652, 22 
N.E.2d 132 (1939), the Supreme Court had held that "a 
physician will not be permitted to testify as to statements 
made by his patient relative to the cause of the claimed 
injury, when such statements were not spontaneous but 
were self-serving declarations and in the nature of a 
narrative of a past event." !d. at 655. 
Statements relating to the cause of an injury, however, 
do not include statements of fault. "Thus a patient's 
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statement that he was struck by an automobile would 
qualify but not his statement that the car was driven 
through a red light." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. See also McQueen v. Goldey, 20 Ohio App.3d 
41, 43,484 N.E.2d 712 (1984) (statements in hospital 
record concerning manner in which accident happened 
excluded); Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App.2d 297, 253 
N.E.2d 804 {1969) (opinion of lack of fault in hospital 
record excluded). 
Child Sexual Abuse Cases 
In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220 
(1989)~Jhe0hio Supreme Court questioned the applica-
oility ofthis exception in a child sexual abuse case. The 
court questioned whether a young child would be moti-
vated to make statements for the purpose of medical 
treatment. "The reason is that we really know that such a 
young child is not giving the doctor the information for 
the purposes required by Evid. R. 803(4). More than like-
ly, the child does not even want to be seeing the doctor!" 
!d. at 122. The Court also questioned whether the excep-
tion covered a child's statement identifying the abuser. 
The Court went on to specify the conditions under 
which such statements would satisfy both the require-
ments of Rule 803(4) and the Confrontation Clause: 
Where a child is either available or unavailable and 
the child declarant's out-of-court statements meet the 
rationale and policy of a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule, such as Evid. R. 803(4), and it is demon-
strated that a good-faith effort has been made to 
produce the non-testifying declarant, the out-of-court 
statements are admissible through a third person. The 
statements, however, must have an "indicia of reliabili-
ty" and factors such as the age of the child, the pres-
ence of corroborative physical evidence, the 
relationship of the victim to the accused, the child's 
relationship to the persons to whom the statements 
are made, and the terminology used by the child are to 
be used in determining reliability. /d. at 127. 
RECORDED RECOLLECTION 
Rule 803(5) recognizes a hearsay exception for past 
recollection recorded. The rule requires that: (1) the 
witness had firsthand knowledge of a matter; (2) the 
witness made or adopted a memorandum or record 
concerning the matter "when the matter was fresh in 
his memory"; (3) the memorandum or record reflects 
the witness' "knowledge correctly"; and (4) thewit-
ness has "insufficient recollection to enable him to 
testify fully and accurately" about the matter recorded. 
The exception for past recollection recorded should 
be distinguished from the practice of refreshing 
recollection, which does not involve hearsay evidence 
and is governed by Rule 612. In some cases a 
memorandum qualifying as recorded recollection 
under Rule 803(5) will itself contain hearsay. In such a 
case admissibility is governed by Rule 805 (multiple 
hearsay). 
The trustworthiness of records of past recollection 
"is found in the reliability inherent in a record made 
while events were still fresh in mind and accurately 
reflecting them." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. 
See State v. Scott, 31 Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 
#(1972); Moots v. State, 21 Ohio St. 653 (1871) (business 
· records); Ronald v. Young, 117 Ohio App. 362, 187 
N.E.2d 74 (1963) (business record). 
Preparation of the record 
The rule require& the record or memorandum "to 
have been made or adopted (by the witness] when the 
matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect (his] 
knowledge correctly." These requirements relating to 
the preparation of the record are designed to ensure 
the reliability of the matters contained in the record. 
In State v. Scott, 31 Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the record had to 
have been made "at or near the time of the event." /d. 
(syllabus, para. 1). In contrast, the rule requires that 
the record have been prepared "when the matter was 
fresh in [the witness'] memory." This formulation 
follows Wigmore's view. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence 
§745 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Wigmore argued that the 
"at or near the time" requirement was too restrictive 
and arbitrary. !d. "No precise formula can be applied 
to determine whether this test has been met; perhaps 
the best rule of thumb is that the requirement is not 
met if the time lapse is such, under the circumstances, 
as to suggest that the writing is not likely to be 
accurate." McCormick, Evidence 714 (2d ed. 1972). 
The rule provides that the record may be either 
~ 1epared or adopted by the witness so long as the 
· vv1tness vouches that the record reflects his "knowl-
edge correctly." If the witness makes a statement to a 
third person who prepares a record, the record is 
admissible if the witness verified the accuracy of the 
record at a time when the event was fresh in his 
memory. Even if the witness did not verify the record, 
the record may be admissible if the recorder testifies 
that the record contains an accurate account of the 
witness' statement. This situation involves what 
McCormick refers to as "cooperative records." McCor-
mick, Evidence§ 303 (3d ed. 1984), citing Rathbun v. 
Brancatella, 93 N.J.L. 222, 107 A. 279 (1919). The Advi-
sory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803 indicates 
that cooperative records are admissible under the 
rule: "Multiple person involvement in the process of 
observing and recording, as in Rathbun v. Brancatel-
la, ... is entirely consistent with the exception." 
Rule 803(5) differs from its federal counterpart in 
one respect. The Ohio rule requires that the accuracy 
of the record be established "by the testimony of the 
witness," a requirement not explicitly stated in the 
federal rule. This amendment was intended to avoid 
the suggestion in United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449 
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974), that 
the accuracy of the record could be established 
through the testimony of a third person, even though 
the witness could not recall making the statement 
"·ecorded. 
Insufficient recollection 
The rule requires that the witness have "insufficient 
recollection" of the matter contained in the record to 
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enable him to testify "fully and accurately" at trial. 
This requirement is consistent with State v. Scott, 31 
Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 (1972), in which the 
Supreme Court required that the witness "lack[ ) a 
complete present recollection of the event ... " /d. 
(syllabus, para. 1). 
The "insufficient recollection" requirement does not 
relate to the accuracy of the record or memorandum. 
Rather, it is aimed at avoiding abuse of the exception. 
"[T]he absence of the requirement, it is believed, 
would encourage the use of statements carefully 
prepared for purposes of litigation under the supervi-
sion of attorneys, investigators, or claim adjusters." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
Use of the record or memorandum at trial 
Rule 803(5) provides that if a record qualifies as 
recorded recollection, "the memorandum or record 
may be read into evidence but may not itself be receiv-
ed as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." 
The purpose of this provision is to avoid the risk that 
the record will be given undue weight. This point was 
made in the dissenting opinion in State v. Scott, 31 
Ohio St.2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344 (1972): "(A]dmitting the 
written paper as evidence results in it going to the de-
liberation room with the jury and a patent danger is that 
it will be given undue weight by the jury ... "/d. at 12. 
II 
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